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The (Im-)Possibility of Rational Socialism:
Mises in China’s Market Reform Debate*
Isabella M. Weber, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract
This paper investigates the long first decade of reform in China (1978-1992) to show that
Mises, in particular his initiating contribution to the Socialist Calculation Debate, became
relevant to the reconfiguration of China’s political economy when the reformers gave up on
the late Maoist primacy of continuous revolution and adhered instead to an imperative of
development and catching up. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao had rejected the notions
of efficiency and rational economic management. In the late 1970s, the reformers under Deng
Xiaoping’s leadership elevated these notions to highest principle. As a result, Mises’ critique
that socialism could not achieve a rational economic order came to be debated throughout the
1980s and Chinese economists developed their own reading of Mises and the Socialist
Calculation Debate. When Deng Xiaoping reinstated market reforms in the early 1990s after
the Tiananmen crackdown, a history of thought review of the possibility of rational socialism
and socialist markets helped to justify the Socialist Market Economy with Chinese
Characteristics the official designation of China’s economic system to this day.
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Introduction
This essay traces the role of Ludwig Mises’ claim of the impossibility of rational
socialism in China’s path-defining market reform debate (1978-1992). China’s move from
revolution to reform gave rise to a surge in interest in foreign economics as shown in a number
of recent publications.1 But little is known about Chinese economists’ engagement with the
1

See Pieter Bottelier, Economic Policy Making in China (1949-2016): The Role of Economists (London and
New York: Routledge, 2018); Steven M. Cohen, Competing Economic Paradigms in China: The Co-Evolution
of Economic Events, Economic Theory and Economics Education, 1976-2016 (London and New York:
Routledge, 2017); Julian Gewirtz, Unlikely Partners: Chinese Reformers, Western Economists and the Making
of Global China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017); Rebecca Karl, The Magic of Concepts: History
and the Economic in Twentieth-Century China (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2017); Isabella M.
Weber, “China and Neoliberalism: Moving Beyond the China is/is not Neoliberal Dichotomy,” in The SAGE
Handbook of Neoliberalism, ed. Damien Cahill, Melinda Cooper, Martijn Konings and David Pimrose (London:
SAGE Publications, 2018); Isabella M. Weber und Gregor Semieniuk, “American Radical Economists in Mao’s
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Austrian school in general and Mises in particular at this critical juncture. This essay explores
how the Austrian critique of socialist economics was mobilized by radical Chinese reform
economists to reinterpret the meaning and content of Chinese socialism culminating in the
official designation of the new economic system as Socialist Market Economy with Chinese
Characteristics in 1992.
At the dawn of reform in the late 1970s, Ludwig von Mises’ economics was by no
means new to China. Mises’ contributions had been ‘imported’, discussed and critiqued in
China at least since the 1930s. During the time of the Great Depression China was deeply
integrated into the global capitalist economy and Chinese economists were intellectually and
sociologically connected to global currents of thought. Chinese students pursued graduate
studies in economics in Japan, Europe and the US, some of them under Friedrich Hayek’s
supervision at the London School of Economics (e.g. Zhou Dewei, Jiang Shuojie and Wu
Yuanli).2 Foreign economists such as Augusta Wagner teaching in China compiled textbooks
to introduce Western economics, including Mises’ and Hayek’s critique of socialism.3 Wang
Yanang, famous as cotranslator of David Ricardo, Adam Smith and Karl Marx trained in Japan
and an outspoken critique of Austrian economics at the time, goes as far as to attest that in the
1930s and early 1940s China was undergoing a “wholesale importation … of political economy
as a discipline and science” which resulted in a mechanical application of economics principles
to China. Wang found that Austrian school idealism and metaphysics was a key element of this
importation.4
Rebecca Karl’s reading of Wang resonates with Chinese reform economists’
engagement with Mises half a century later. Seeing China’s reality through the lens of Austrian
economics only left two options, argued Wang: either Austrian economic theory was faulty in

China: From Hopes to Disillusionment,” Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, 37A
(2019): 31-63; Isabella M. Weber, How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate (London
and New York: Routledge, 2020); Isabella M. Weber, “Das westdeutsche und das chinesische
»Wirtschaftswunder«: Der Wettstreit um die Interpretation von Ludwig Erhards Wirtschaftspolitik in Chinas
Preisreformdebatte der 1980er-Jahre,” Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung (2020); Isabella M.
Weber, “Origins of China’s Contested Relation with Neoliberalism: Economics, World Bank, and Milton
Friedman at the Dawn of Reform,” Global Perspectives 1(2020); Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Liu Hong,
“Vergessene Partner im Reformprozess: Der Dialog der VR China mit reform-kommunistischen Strömungen in
Osteuropa (1977–1987),” Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung (2020).
2
For a discussion of their intellectual formation and trajectory in pre-revolutionary China, Taiwan and the
People’s Republic of China see Li Weisen, Feng Xingyuan and Sun Liang, “The Diffusion of F.A. Hayek’s
Thoughts in Mainland China and Taiwan,” in The Diffusion of Western Economic Ideas in East Asia, ed.
Malcolm Warner (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 214-234; Paul B. Trescott, Jingji Xue: The History
of the Introduction of Western Economic Ideas into China, 1850-1950 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University
Press, 2007), 83-85.
3
Trescott, Jingji Xue, 150-1.
4
Karl, Magic of Concepts, 2-4, 81-6.
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China’s context and China required instead empiricist exceptionalism; or Chinese realty was
at fault for not complying with the Austrian metaphysical universalism and required changing.
The earlier conclusion led to reducing economics to the positivist scientific method. The latter
reinforced a wide-spread sentiment among Chinese economists that stressed feudalism over
imperialism and argued for the need of capitalism and the market as a progressive force. 5
Followers of Mises and Hayek found the Nationalists’ collectivism as unfit to free China from
its feudalist backwardness and called for free enterprise instead.6
Many of China’s prominent promoters of Austrian economics of the 1930s and 1940s
fled to Taiwan where they pioneered the translation of Mises, Hayek, Röpke and others and
lobbied for neoliberal economic policies.7 In contrast, after the Communist revolution in 1949
Austrian economics largely vanished in the People’s Republic except for a short revival from
the viewpoint of critique in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The disaster of the Great Leap
Forward and the catastrophe of the Great Famine posed again the question of the right
economic system and the role of the law of value under socialism in China’s young People’s
Republic. In this context, Soviet-trained Sun Yefang pioneered the demand for socialist
markets inspired by Oscar Lange and the Socialist Calculation Debate.8 In 1962 Teng Weizao
translated Hayek’s (1944) The Road to Serfdom. 9 Teng assures that the purpose of this
translation was criticism.10 Yet, given the failure of the great push for collectivization that was
becoming apparent at the time, Hayek’s critique of collectivism must have resonated with some
of Teng’s readers. As this essay shows, some 20 years later, this Austrian critique and Mises’
claim of the impossibility of a rational socialist economy was embraced by some prominent
Chinese reform economists and political leaders. It came to play a role in the redefinition of
China’s economic model in the 1980s and early 1990s.
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I draw on Chinese articles published on Mises in the period 1978-1992 to show that
Mises, in particular his initiating contribution to the Socialist Calculation Debate,11 became
relevant to the reconfiguration of China’s political economy when the reformers gave up on
the late Maoist primacy of the revolution of the relations of production and adhered instead to
an imperative of the development of the forces of production and catching up.12 During the
Cultural Revolution, Mao had rejected the notions of efficiency and rational economic
management. In the late 1970s, the reformers under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership elevated these
notions to highest principle. As a result, Mises’ (1920) critique that socialism could not achieve
a rational economic order came to be debated throughout the 1980s and Chinese economists
developed their own reading of Mises and the Socialist Calculation Debate. When market
reforms were reinstated in the 1990s after having been stalled since the Tiananmen crackdown,
a history of thought review of the possibility of rational socialism and socialist markets by
Jiang Chunze helped to justify the Socialist Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics as
the new official designation of China’s economic system and target for reform.

From Continuous Revolution to Economic Determinism: How Mises
Became Relevant to China’s Reform
The communist dreamland of liberated individuals and universal solidarity cracked in
the People’s Republic when the regime alienated itself from the population by
allowing bureaucratic privileges on the one hand and excessive persecution of
opponents on the other. But it was not until the revolution’s emancipatory promises
were broken in a ‘feudal tyranny’ toward the end of the Cultural Revolution that
many believed that much of the original communist strength had been destroyed. The
exhaustion was so evident that the power transition after Mao died in September 1976
would be initiated by a ‘coup’ to remove his widow, Jiang Qing, and her allies, an
event that had been waited for and was celebrated in the streets. The breakthrough,
no doubt a case of political secrecy and Byzantine politics, nevertheless brought to
the fore a broad consensus on the need of the country to open up, liberalize, and
democratize.13
Lin Chun’s synthesis of the critical moment in the 1970s when China shifted from late
Maoism to reform helps us to understand how Mises became relevant to China’s

Ludwig Mises, “Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialistischen Gemeinwesen,” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften
47 (1920): 86-121. For an English translation see Ludwig Mises “Economic Calculation in the Socialist
Commonwealth,” in Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism, ed.
Friedrich A. Hayek; translated by S. Adler (London: Routledge & Kegan, Paul, 1963), 87-130.
12
For a broad analysis of the relation between Mises work on socialism and the Chinese reformers’ rethinking
of socialism see Weber, “China and Neoliberalism” and Weber, “Origins of China’s Contested Relation with
Neoliberalism.”
13
Lin Chun, The Transformation of Chinese Socialism (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006),
207.
11
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reconfiguration of the political economy. It was this breaking down of the hope for a
“communist dreamland”, the collapse of the “revolution’s emancipatory promises” and the
exhaustion of the “original communist strength” that gave way to a reorientation from Mao’s
emphasis on ‘continuous revolution’ to Deng Xiaoping’s ‘reform and opening up’. Per capita
grain output as a measure both of nutrition standards and leeway for industrialization had
stagnated14 and when many Chinese officials joined delegations to tour the world under Mao’s
designated heir Hua Guofeng, they found how far China’s material development lacked
behind.15 This sentiment combined with the lost hope in the revolution’s promises laid the
ground for China’s reorientation towards a primacy of economic development and efficiency.
Only when China gave up on achieving revolution in the present and instead pursued a
rationalization of its economy did Mises’ claim of the impossibility of a rational socialist
economy become pertinent to China’s economics discourse.
A shift to a more orthodox version of historical materialism prepared the return of Mises
and the Socialist Calculation Debate to China. The paradigm of reform turned Mao upside
down. Mao had rejected Lenin’s claim that the “transition from capitalism to socialism will be
more difficult for a country the more backward it is.” Against this Mao stated: “Actually, the
transition is less difficult the more backward an economy is.”16 The doctrine of reform returned
to the logic of Lenin’s dictum: In the words of the leading party intellectual Su Shaozhi the
“less developed the country, the more difficult the transition from capitalism to socialism.”17
It follows from this that economic development is essential for the transition to socialism. The
immanent ideological shift of the first years of reform encompassed a rejection of the Cultural
Revolution line that saw the main task to achieve socialism in revolutionizing the relations of
production. Achieving higher levels of development of the relations of production, would in
turn lead to a progress of the forces of production. The shift from revolution to reform meant
that this causality was reversed. Now all emphasis was on developing the forces of production.
As a result of this logic of economic determinism, the relations of production no longer needed
to be revolutionized in their own right. Instead, they had to be redesigned to best advance the

Robert Ash, “Squeezing the Peasants: Grain Extraction, Food Consumption, and Rural Living Standards in
Mao’s China,” The China Quarterly 188(2006): 959-998.
15
Hua Sheng, Luo Xiaopeng and Zhang Xiejung, China: From Revolution to Reform (Houndmills and London:
Macmillan Press, 1993), 23.
16
Mao Zedong, A Critique of Soviet Economics (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1977 [1967]),
50. For a discussion of this text and Mao’s critique of Soviet orthodoxy see Maurice Meisner, “The Advantages
and Burdens of Backwardness: Some Reflections on Maoism and Marxism at the Close of the Maoist Era,”
Asian Thought and Society 2:1 (1977): 40.
17
Su Shaozhi, “Response to Commentary, 15 January,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 20:1(1988): 31.
14
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forces of production which was in turn argued to be the most effective way to move towards
socialism.18
In these first years of reform, Mao’s theories of class struggle under socialism and of
continuous revolution, his impatience and overestimation of man’s will were singled out as
gravely mistaken, utopian and unscientific.19 This assessment was codified in the official 1981
‘Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People’s
Republic of China’. 20 Jing Rongben, in an early contribution on the Socialist Calculation
Debate in China’s leading economics journal, Economic Research (经济研究),21 implicitly
shows that the fundamental ideological reorientation of the Resolution laid the ground for
Mises’ relevance to China’s reforms. He argues it was undeniable that contradictions emerged
in the Soviet-inspired economic model of public ownership, central planning and distribution
according to labor. According to Rong, there were two interpretations of the emergence of such
contradictions. The first stresses that the relations and forces of production are co-developing
and sees contradictions as result of remnants of capitalism and bourgeois thought in socialist
society. This would long have been the Soviet perspective. The second view admits the
possibility of a contradiction between Soviet-style relations of production and the development
of the forces of production and argues for a plurality of socialist economic systems which
reflect different historical conditions. Rong stresses that this second view was sanctioned by
the Chinese Communist Party in the 1981 Resolution. This interpretation would necessitate
comparative economic systems research to adjust China’s economic model to its stage of
historical development. The study of comparative economic systems, in Rong’s eyes, was
importantly shaped by the Socialist Calculation Debate that began with Mises’ (1920)
contribution. Against Mises’ claim that a rational socialist economy was impossible since
central planners could not correctly calculate all prices in the economy which left them without
a reliable standard of value, Lange had posited the possibility of using the market mechanism

18

See Sun Yan, The Chinese Reassessment of Socialism, 1976-1992 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1995), 184-87.
19
See Maurice Meisner, Marxism, Maoism and Utopianism (Madison and London: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1982), ix.
20
Communist Party of China, “Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of
the People’s Republic of China, 1981” Retrieved from
https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm. For a general comparison of Mises’
understanding of socialism and that expressed in the CPC’s 1981 Resolution see Weber, “Origins of China’s
Contest Relation with Neoliberalism.”
21
Rong Jingben, “On the Comparative Study of Socialist Economic
Models,”[关于社会主义经济模式的比较研究] Economic Research [经济研究]12(1981): 9-16.
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to serve central planning. Thereby, stresses Rong, Lange used bourgeois economics. It follows
that in China’s search for a new economic model bourgeois economics constitutes a useful tool.
Rong’s emphasis on the usefulness of bourgeois economics is representative of the
general rehabilitation of economics in the era of reform. During the Cultural Revolution, a
study of the forces of production independent of the relations of production was considered a
bourgeois aberration. Economics as a discipline was largely dismissed and many economists
spend years in the countryside undergoing ‘reeducation’ through labor or like Gu Zhun were
sent to prison.22 With the new primacy of economic development in the late 1970s economists
and their discipline were rehabilitated.23 Catching up through reform meant “making up lessons”
in bourgeois economics which had previously been condemned as “capitalist poison”. China
embarked on a path of learning from foreign economists which involved rapidly growing
exchanges.24
As the relations of production were reconceptualized under reform as tools serving the
larger goal of growth and development, the question of whether the market could serve
socialism rose to the top of the agenda as early as 1979. For example, at the famous Wuxi
conference that year two economists of the Chinese Academy of Social Science, Zhao Renwei
and Liu Guoguang, argued for the need of markets. According to them, in the past, the socialist
countries had treated “economic planning and the market … as being mutually exclusive, as if
there were no place for the market in a planned economy” but “such a view” had “brought a
series of disasters” to China’s economy. Without making any references to the protagonists of
the Socialist Calculation Debate, they suggested instead to promote free competition and the
regulation of prices by supply and demand within a certain range, such as for the market
mechanism to become the main means in allocating manpower, materials and funds. 25 Deng
Xiaoping sanctioned this view some months later when he told a foreign journalist:
It is wrong to maintain that a market economy exists only in capitalist society and that
there is only [a] ‘capitalist’ market economy. Why can’t we develop a market economy

22

See Els van Dongen, Realistic Revolution: Contesting Chinese History, Culture, and Politics after 1989
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 123; Barry Naughton, “Editor’s Introduction: Biographical
Preface,” in Wu Jinglian: Voice of Reform, ed. Barry Naughton (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013), 107-8; Carl
Riskin, China’s Political Economy: The Quest for Development since 1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1988), 163-4.
23
See Lin, “The Reinstatement of Economics in China Today.”
24
See footnote 1.
25
Liu Guoguang and Zhao Renwei, “On the Relationship Between Planning and Market in a Socialist
Economy,”[论社会主义经济中计划与市场的关系] Economic Research [经济研究] 5(1979): 47-56, author’s
own translation.
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under socialism? Developing a market economy does not mean practising capitalism.
While maintaining a planned economy as the mainstay of our economic system, we are
also introducing a market economy. But it is a socialist market economy.26
It was to take another 13 years of intense political struggle and debate until the Socialist
Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics was to become officially the designation of
China’s economic model. But once the question of China’s political economy had been
reframed in terms of the most efficient allocation of resources and the most effective
advancement of the forces of production, the question how the market could serve as a tool
towards this end under socialism became centerstage in debates among Chinese economists.
This prompted exchanges with Eastern European (former) market socialists such as
Włodzimierz Brus, Ota Šik and later Janos Kornai in parts facilitated by the World Bank. 27 It
also gave rise to a fierce debate among reform economists who emphasized that China’s reform
path had to be carved out through experimentation on the ground improving the material
conditions one step at a time, and more academic economists who sought to define a blueprint
for reform in theory to be implemented in one big package. 28 Such a package would have
importantly involved overnight price liberalization which is a key component of shock therapy
as it was later implemented in other socialist countries. The economists in search of a blueprint
became invested in the subdiscipline of comparative economic systems and some studied the
historical Socialist Calculation Debate. In this context, Mises (1920) considered as the initiator
of the Socialist Calculation Debate was frequently acknowledged as an important contributor
to comparative economic systems. Mises entered China’s reform debate as the economist who
had posed the crucial question of whether a rational socialist economy was possible at a time
when Chinese leaders had declared such a rationalization as a foremost goal.29

Deng Xiaoping, “Answers to the Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci, August 21 and 23, 1980,” in Selected
Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1982 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1984), 327.
27
See Gewirtz, Unlikely Partners, 64-80; Liu Hong The Eighties: Glory and Dreams of Chinese Economic
Scholars [80年代： 中国经济学人的光荣与梦想](Guilin: Guanxi Normal University Press, 2010), pp.;
Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Liu, “Vergessene Partner im Reformprozess“; Edwin Lim, “The Opening of the
Mind to the Outside World in China’s Reform and Opening Process“ [中国改革开放过程中的对外思想开放 ],
in eds. Wu Jinglian, Fan Gang, Liu He, Justin Yifu Lin et al., 50 Chinese Economists Review the Last 30 Years
(Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, 2008).
28
Weber, “China and Neoliberalism”; Weber, How China Escaped Shock Therapy
29
For a discussion on attempts at rationalization in China’s early years of reform see Barry Naughton, Growing
out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform 1978-1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 127-30.
26
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Rethinking the Market and Socialism: Chinese Economists’ Interpretation
of Mises
The first stage of China’s reform was marked by the fast pace of the rural reforms. In
1984, the reform of the industrial-urban economy was officially sanctioned when the
“Resolution

on

the

Reform

of

the

Economy

System”

（中共中央关于经济体制改革的决定）was approved by the Central Committee. This
constituted a formal commitment by the CPC to reform China’s basic economic model.30 The
Resolution declared that socialism and a commodity economy were not mutually exclusive.
The reformers distanced themselves from what was labeled the ‘traditional view’ that socialism
should supersede commodity relations and structure relations of production around use not
exchange values. From now on China’s planned economy should use the law of value, that is
to say socialist production units should be turned into independent commodity producers taking
their production decisions based on exchange values. The development of such a commodityproducing economy was declared a prerequisite for China’s modernization. Yet, China’s
commodity economy should take a socialist form by being planned and adhering to public
ownership.31
The 1984 Resolution was a broad-brush statement of the direction of China’s reform.
Clearly, it officially sanctioned a wide-ranging use of markets and the price mechanism. But
the precise constitution of China’s planned commodity economy, especially the relation
between planning and market remained open.32 Extending the dual-price system to the core of
the urban-industrial economy and the introduction of a new tax system that made enterprises
responsible for their own profits and losses were important new policies implemented that year.
Numerous and diverse experiments evaluated by practically minded economists contributed to
working out a new economic model in practice. At the same time, the Resolution gave impetus
to a surge in theoretical studies discussing the history of thought on socialist economic models,
often conducted by economists calling for the need of a coordinated market reform package.33

30

See Joseph Fewsmith, Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Conflict and Economic Debate (Armonk and
New York: M.E. Sharp, 1994) 137-8; Naughton, Growing out of the Plan, 178-80; Ezra F. Vogel, Deng
Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2011) 4667.
31
Lin Zili, “Socialism and the Commodity Economy,” Chinese Economic Studies 19:1 (1985): 65-7.
32
Fewsmith, Dilemmas of Reform in China, 134.
33
Fewsmith, Dilemmas of Reform in China, 163-5.
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In this context, a wave of papers re-evaluated Mises (1920) and the Socialist
Calculation Debate34 building on earlier contributions focused on Mises’ socialist adversary
Oskar Lange35 and Milton Friedman’s interpretation of the Socialist Calculation Debate in his
speeches in China. 36 This becomes apparent when surging for Mises (米塞斯), Lange
（兰格）and economic calculation (经济计算) in China’s most important scientific database
China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). We can observe a general pattern with some
variations in these contributions. They broadly agree that Mises’ question of the possibility of
a rational socialist economy poses an important and productive challenge to the attempt at
developing socialist reform models. Yet, in the 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese economists
rejected Mises’ answer that only a private property, free market type economy could achieve a
rational economic order but accepted his framing of the problem. They also tend to see Lange
as too idealist and his model as unrealistic, but adopt his emphasis on the possibility of markets
under socialism. The reviews of Mises and the Socialist Calculation Debate serve to call for a
need to employ the tools of comparative economic systems research to develop a blueprint for
China’s new economic model. This constitutes a form of Hegelian “Aufhebung” where Mises’
answer to his question of the possibility of rational socialism is initially rejected, yet his
framing of the problem of a rational economy is retained thus pathing the way for making
China’s economic discourse commensurable with Austrian economics.37 Let me elaborate my
reading of the Chinese reform economists’ interpretation of Mises based on some salient
examples.
The first Chinese translation of Mises (1935 [1920]) “Economic Calculation in the
Socialist Commonwealth” (社会主义制度下的经济计算) appeared in 1986 in Comparative

See for example Rong Jingben, “Thoughts on the Relationship Between Ownership and Market in a Socialist
Economy: Economic Calculation in the Socialist System”[社会主义经济中所有制和市场关系的思考——
谈社会主义制度下的经济计算], Comparative Economic & Social Systems [经济社会体制比较] 2(1986): 64,
58; Jiang Chunze and Zhang Yuyan, “Several Issues on Comparative Economic System Studies”
[关于比较经济体制学的若干问题], The Journal of World Economy [世界经济] 10 (1987): 38-46; Guo Xibao,
“Ludwig von Mises” [卢德维·冯·米塞斯], The Journal of World Economy [世界经济] 10 (1987): 92-93.
35
See for example Zhang Zizhuang, “A Brief Introduction to Lange’s Socialist Economic
Model,”[兰格的社会主义经济模型简介] Economic Perspectives [经济学动态] 11(1979): 29-36; Jing
Rongben, “On the Comparative Study of Socialist Economic Models”; Wang Hongchang, “A Brief Introduction
to Lange’s ‘Introduction to Economic Cybernetics’” [兰格的《经济控制论导论》简介], Economic
Perspectives [经济学动态] 11(1981).
36
See Wang Liansheng, Friedman’s Discussion of Market Mechanism and Centrally Planned Economy
[弗里德曼谈市场机制与中央经济计划]，经济学动态，Economic Perspectives [经济学动态] 11(1983). For
a detailed interpretation of Friedman’s speeches in China see Weber, “Origins of China’s Contested Relation
with Neoliberalism.”
37
For a detailed account of paradigm shifts in the economics discipline in China (1976-2016) see Cohen,
Competing Economic Paradigms in China.
34
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Social and Economic Systems (经济社会体制比较).38 This new journal had just been founded
in 1985 in response to the 1984 Resolution.39 Driving forces and leading editors of the journal
have been Zhao Renwei, author of the 1979 paper on market and plan mentioned earlier and
prominent reform economists, Wu Jinglian, a reform economist in China often dubbed as
“Market Wu” due to his free market radicalism, and Rong Jingben, trained in Russian studies
and a scholar of comparative economic systems based at the Marxism Research Institute of the
Compilation and Translation Bureau of the Central Committee. Wu and Rong had previously
collaborated in an attempt to publish transcriptions of speeches by Brus and Šik during their
visits to China in 1979-80 and 1981 respectively. However, the publication of the market
reform proposals by these two Eastern European émigré economists was censored.40 The 1984
Resolution created a political opening that allowed for a new push towards comparative
economics meant to path the way for a radical price, tax and wage reform program launched
but not implemented in 1986. 41 This initiative was supported by translations of foreign
language texts on the relation between market and socialism, including Mises (1920).
The editor’s note introducing the translation of Mises (1920) set the tone for subsequent
interpretations of the text and its implicit or explicit relevance to China. First, the editor stresses
that Mises wrote his article as a critique of the planning practice under Soviet war communism.
Thus, argues the editor, when Mises says socialism what he really refers to is Soviet war
communism. By the mid-1980s China had largely broken with the Soviet planning model. It
becomes implicitly clear that Mises’ analysis is only relevant to China as regards the question
he raises on the (im-)possibility of rational socialism not the negative answer he provides. The
Peking University economics professor and popularizer of marginalist economics, Yan Zhijie,
made this point clear in his later analysis of Mises (1920). Yan urges that instead of dismissing
Mises as a capitalist apologist, China’s reformers had to realize that his criticism concerned the
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traditional Soviet model and that Mises had anticipated some of the deficiencies that had
prompted China to reform the old system.42
The editor of Mises’ (1920) translation pointed out, Mises had shown that with the
abolishment of commodities and money under socialism it became impossible to conduct
rational calculation and thus to use planning as an efficient economic mechanism. The editor
rejects Mises’ stance that private ownership was a necessary condition for the market
mechanism and thus for a rational economy as too extreme. Yet, Mises’ question, according to
the editor, had not only given rise to the Socialist Calculation Debate of the 1920s and 1930s
but was worth pondering in the context of China’s reform. In the 1984 Resolution the use of
money-commodity relations under Chinese socialism had been resurrected. The editor suggests
that Mises’ contribution would be useful in rethinking the relation between the market and
public ownership in this context. Thus, while Mises’ dismissive stance on the possibility of
markets under public ownership was questioned, the claim of the need for a rational economic
mechanism and efficient resource allocation was accepted as relevant to the design of China’s
reform.
In a longer commentary on Mises (1920) published with the Chinese translation, Rong
Jingben further elaborates the editor’s take – which might well have also been written by him.43
Confirming the Austrian market universalism, Rong asserts that all socialist countries
undergoing reform would now agree on the necessity of markets. According to Rong, markets
were needed not only for consumer goods and labor as in the Lange model 44 but also for the
means of production and finance. Replicating Mises’ (1920) arguments, Rong elaborates that
as long as the means of production were not evaluated on the market, there was no way for
prices to be rational. Implying a strong anti-egalitarian message, Rong continues that given the
heterogeneity of different types of labor, it was equally impossible for labor input to be
correctly valuated without market competition. Finally, as long as banks were all part of one
big state-owned system treating all enterprises equally, investments could not be following
rational standards of efficiency and consumer demand. So, finance, too, had to be regulated by
the market.45
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Having established the necessity for complete markets in full agreement with Mises,
Rong turns to the question of ownership. He suggests that a discussion based on Mises’
contribution was needed not only on whether markets are compatible with socialist public
ownership but also on whether there might be superior markets without public ownership. Rong
asseverates that China must stick to socialist public ownership but hastens to add that this
cannot mean pure public ownership. In reality, China would already practice mixed ownership
forms including individual and private enterprise as well as foreign capitalist investment. Rong
ends his comment on the note that ultimately the essence of public ownership was to facilitate
the accumulation of wealth in society whereas the purpose of socialist reform was to build a
more efficient economic system. This is very much in line with the Dengist dictum of the time
that “poverty is not socialism” and that “the fundamental task of socialism is to develop
productivity” (Fewsmith 1995, 207). In Rong’s Austrian inspired interpretation, socialism is
reduced to a tool for economic growth and all egalitarian ambitions and communist visions of
a life without alienation are discarded. In sum, Rong has stretched his endorsement of Mises
to the maximum attainable degree in a journal published by the Central Compilation and
Translation Bureau under the political circumstances at the time. The only remaining difference
between Rong and Mises, is Rong’s stress on mixed rather than pure private ownership.
Rong might have been the most sympathetic interpreter of Mises at the time. For
example Jiang Chunze in an article co-authored with Zhang Yuyan presents a more cautious
or subtle interpretation.46 Jiang, a prominent scholar of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
had just returned from being a visiting scholar at the University of Illinois, the University of
Berkeley and the Woodrow Wilson International Center where she would have encountered
the research frontier in economics and comparative economic systems. Jiang and Zhang couch
their analysis of Mises in a broad call for the use of the tools of comparative economic systems
in China’s economic system reform debate. Their article provides what was likely to be the
most comprehensive history of thought account of the socialist calculation debate in Chinese
to that date covering Pareto, Barone, Taylor, Hayek and Robbins, and Lange. Against the
background of the larger debate, they criticize Mises for suggesting that there is only one
possible form of socialism modeled on the Soviet war communism. In contrast, the experience
of socialism over half a century, they argue, had demonstrated that in reality there is a plurality
of models with multiple arrangements of public property. Yet, they emphasize the importance
of Mises’ framing of the problem: his insight that economic calculation was necessary for
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rational resource allocation has proved to be profound and should guide China’s reform. In
order to develop its own efficient system, China should employ the tools of comparative
economic systems and move away from the old way of focusing on “isms”, i.e. capitalism
versus socialism. For Jiang and Zhang and China’s proponent of comparative economic
systems more broadly, Mises serves to reframe the question of the reconstitution of China’s
political economy as a technical problem to be solved with the modern tools of marginalist
economics rather than the reading of classics in Maoism-Marxism-Leninism or fieldwork
evaluating policy experiments.
While Mises is predominantly considered by Chinese reform economists for his
contribution to the socialist calculation debate, some first contributions also appear in the
second half of the 1980s on his larger body of work. For example, Guo Xibao of the Wuhan
economics department surveyed Mises’ theories of money and the business cycle, his antiKeynesianism and his study of human behavior.47 Guo stresses Mises’ influence in the West
in light of the decline of Keynesianism and the new rise of liberalism but comes to the
conclusion that Chinese economists don’t have much to learn from Mises. Another example is
the Chinese translation of a Japanese article titled “Is Free Science Possible?” that introduced
discussions on the methodological and epistemological foundations of Mises’ work including
the notions of praxeology and introspection and his rejection of positivism.48 But clearly, the
greatest interest aroused Mises’ work on the impossibility of rational socialism.
Most Chinese commentators dismissed Lange’s model as too idealist and thus not
useful for China’s purposes of reform. Yet, the evaluation of Mises’ contribution by most
Chinese economists is in agreement with that of Lange. Xiao Xin quotes Lange to this end:49
Socialists have certainly good reason to be grateful to Professor Mises, the great
advocatus diaboli of their cause. For it was his powerful challenge that forced the
socialists to recognise the importance of an adequate system of economic accounting
to guide the allocation of resources in a socialist economy.50
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By accepting Mises’ framing of the problem of socialist economic systems, an
influential fraction of Chinese reform economists made China’s market reform debate
commensurable with Western mainstream economics and the global neoliberal economic
hegemony. Market socialists like Lange and his successors like Brus and Kornai thereby served
as a bridge, consciously introduced to China by the World Bank for precisely this purpose.51

Paving the Way for the Socialist Market Economy with Chinese
Characteristics
In 1986 and again in 1988 initiatives launched first by Zhao Ziyang and then by Deng
Xiaoping to liberalize the prices of essential means of production and labor combined with farreaching tax and financial reform failed. 52 If successful, these reform pushes would have
constituted a big policy step towards the Mises-inspired vision articulated by Rong. Despite
the failure of these major policy initiatives, in 1987 a renewed ideological re-articulation of the
nature of Chinese socialism moved Chinese reform ideology further in Mises’ direction. At the
Thirteenth National Congress of the CPC party general secretary Zhao Ziyang officially
announced that China was in the primary stage of socialism. This concept had initially been
rejected by the reform leaders as heresy when articulated by Su Shaozhi and Feng Lanrui.53 In
1987, declaring China to be in the primary stage of socialism meant that China’s so-called
economic backwardness served as justification to further lift constraints on private ownership
and the market. On this basis, Zhao Ziyang promoted dropping “planned” in the designation of
China’s economy and to move to a socialist commodity economy without further
qualifications. 54 Around that time and in the context of this renewed thrust towards more
comprehensive marketisation, Murray Rothbard claims: “The Mises Institute...where I'm vice
president, got a message from the Chinese Embassy in Washington DC that they wanted all
the works of Ludwig von Mises, they want to figure out how to desocialize.”55 But the collapse
of first price and then social stability in 1988 and the political upheaval of 1989 led market
reforms to grind to a halt.
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In 1990, market reformers faced with the challenge to relaunch their agenda mobilized
interpretations of Mises and the Socialist Calculation Debate. The newly appointed director of
the State Commission for Economic System Reform, Chen Jinhua, was a convinced advocate
of the need for the market to liberate and develop China’s productive forces.56 Chen required
a theoretical analysis to justify his political agenda. He asked Jiang Chunze, then deputy head
of the Economic System Division of his commission to compile a review of the international
debate and experience of the relation between plan and market.57 Drawing on her earlier work,
Jiang now revisited her evaluation of the Socialist Calculation Debate to argue that both the
market and planning were neutral means of resource allocation. As such they could not be the
defining feature of socialism or capitalism. Further, 20th century history, according to Jiang,
had shown that market economies were superior in enhancing productive forces. Thus, since a
planned economy was not a requirement for socialism, China was best advised to transform its
economic system from a planned to a market economy.
Jiang recapitulates Mises argument that rational prices constitute a necessary condition
for an efficient economy and could only be achieved by the market. In contrast to Lange, who
saw the market as a trial and error mechanism to serve the plan, Jiang argued for a full-fledged
market economy as the basic means of resource allocation. She pushes Lange’s idea of market
socialism to a new level. If socialism can use the market to aid planning, it can also use it as
fundamental economic mechanism. This would not prevent China from also using
macroeconomic planning, Jiang insists. Keynesians and Neoliberals – in Jiang’s view – had
come to agree that the modern market economy is not a pure laissez faire economy and that
some extent of intervention was required. Hence, there was no reason that China could not also
combine a market economy with macroeconomic planning and that this would be socialist by
virtue of liberating China’s forces of production.58
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Chen was impressed with Jiang’s succinct argument in line with his marketisation
agenda and shared her report with Jiang Zemin who had replaced Zhao Ziyang as General
Secretary of the CPC in 1989, Premier Li Peng, and Deng Xiaoping who all endorsed the
review and added it to the reference material for the upcoming Seventh Plenary Session of the
13th Party Central Committee. On the eve of this important Plenum, Deng Xiaoping called a
meeting with party leaders and basically endorsed the message of Jiang Chunze’s report. Deng
is quote to have said:
We must get clear theoretically that the difference between capitalism and socialism
does not lie in planning or market” and may “not think that we are following the
capitalist road for developing a market economy. ... Both planning and market are
needed. If we do not have a market, we cannot get information from the world and that
would be to resign ourselves to a backward status… .59
Deng failed to gain the Central Committee’s support for his line at this time (Vogel
2011, 667-8). Several new articles delivering interpretations of Mises and the Socialist
Calculation Debate in ways compatible with Jiang Chunze’s report appeared in 1990-1992.60
When Deng launched his Southern Tour in 1992, preparing the return to his vision of market
reform, he reiterated his earlier statement echoing Jiang’s report.61 In October 1992, the 14th
CPC National Congress took the formal decision to establish a Socialist Market Economy with
Chinese Characteristics. Jiang Zemin explained this new leading concept. His words once more
resonated with Jiang Chunze’s and others’ ‘anything goes’ solution to Mises’ framing of the
problem of rational socialism:
Whether the emphasis was on planning or on market regulation was not the essential
distinction between socialism and capitalism. This brilliant thesis has helped free us
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from the restrictive notion that the planned economy and the market economy belong
to basically different social systems, thus bringing about a great breakthrough in our
understanding of the relation between planning and market regulation.62
The Fourteenth Congress also further eroded the primacy of public ownership and
stressed the need for diverse ownership forms and equal competition between state and nonstate competition thereby legitimizing foreign and private ownership.63 To be sure, the CPC
maintained its ultimate primacy in all affairs, including the economy, and its own logic of
economic governance distinct from the global neoliberal mainstream.64 But by the early 1990s,
China had come a long way from Mao’s agenda of continuous revolution in the direction of
Mises’ emphasis on rational allocation and the superiority of the market economy.

Conclusion
A large wave of scholarly interest in Mises’ whole body of work and Austrian
economics swept China in the late 1990s. This by far outsized the early reform era engagement
with Mises I have analyzed in this essay. Neoliberal thinking gained wide-spread traction when
privatization had moved to the top of China’s policy agenda and the Chinese government
negotiated accession to the World Trade Organization. Rather than focusing on this big tide
that has received some recent scholarly attention,65 this essay analyzes how in the first long
decade of reform and opening up the intellectual and ideological foundation of China’s
economic system was reconstituted in ways that made China’s economics discourse
commensurable with the global mainstream.
In the 1930s, Wang Yanang diagnosed that there were only two possible results when
applying Austrian economics to China’s reality: positivist exceptionalism and metaphysical
universalism. The genealogy of the Socialist Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics in
this essay leads us to read China’s market reforms as an attempt to reconcile precisely these
two tendencies. On the one hand, China’s reformers have subscribed to the universalism of the
market economy as only viable form of rational economic organization and as without
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alternative in China’s attempt to escape backwardness. As such, they have fully embraced both
Mises’ insistence on the need for a rational economic mechanism and efficient resource
allocation as well as his claim that this could only be achieved by a market economy. Yet, the
reformers stress China’s exceptionalism and reject Mises’ necessity of universal private
property as unfounded idealism not compatible with Chinese reality. China’s reformers have
made wide-ranging concessions but ultimately stand firm that China’s socialist ambition and
specific historical circumstances require a plurality of ownership relations with a leading role
for public ownership. The tension between this embrace of market universalism and insistence
on Chinese exceptionalism continues to this day and provides a lens that can help us understand
some of the continuing contradictions in China’s relation with global neoliberalism.

